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1. Introduction 
The enforcement of equality and the improvement of its protection has been an on-going 
process within the European Union (henceforth also ‘EU’) for many years now. Since the first 
leading case in this field,1 the European Court of Justice has constantly stressed the need to 
ensure the respect of this principle within each and every EU policy and piece of legislation, 
as well as national activities pertinent to the EU.  
Among the suitable tools for the achievement of the abovementioned goal, one in particular 
has proven its value: the general principles. The reliance on general principles of EU law has 
in fact been the key to both broadening the protection of equality and achieving its 
enforcement.2  
Notwithstanding the contribution of general principles towards the enhancement of equality 
within the EU, the European Court of Justice has yet to adopt a uniform approach when dealing 
with general principles. The lack of any methodology by the Court of Justice has led to a lack 
of consistency within its case law: as the article will point out, some recent rulings in the field 
of age and disability discrimination not only highlight the unpredictability of the Court of 
Justice rulings but also how these rulings are misaligned towards the achievement of effective 
equality.    
To prove this point, the paper will focus on some recent decisions of the Court of Justice 
concerning age and disability anti-discrimination law where the Court’s choice either to rely 
on or to avoid EU general principles reveals a few shortcomings. The paper has then the 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law, University of Bedfordshire, elena.gualco@beds.ac.uk. The Author wishes to thank the two 
anonymous referees of DPCE, for reading the article and providing useful comments. However, errors and 
omissions in the article are the sole responsibility of the Author. 
1 Judgment of the Court of 12 November 1969, 29/69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt, 
ECLI:EU:C:1969:57. 
2 See M. BELL, The principle of equal treatment: widening and deepening, in P. CRAIG, G. DE BURCA (eds.), The 
evolution of EU law, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2011, 611 ff. 
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ultimate aim of assessing – in the targeted fields of age and disability discrimination – the 
extent to which general principles should represent a preferred option for the enforcement of 
equality. 
 
2. The establishment of equality through general principles 
In order to properly investigate the role of general principles in the selected Court of Justice 
case law, a few preliminary observations are needed. Although the following observations 
apply to the general principle of equality as a whole, they will be further developed in this 
paper with sole regard to the chosen criteria of age and disability discrimination. 
First, it has to be recalled that the development of the concept of equality in itself is closely 
linked to the creation and shaping of the EU general principles. As matter of fact it was indeed 
in an anti-discrimination case where the EU Court of Justice firstly employed the concept of 
EU general principles: if in Stauder3 general principles firstly acted as judiciary-driven 
provisions, they have since then increased their constitutional role within the architecture of 
the European Union.4  
At a time when the European Community did not have any competence in the field of human 
rights, the reliance on an unwritten source of law (i.e. general principles) was grounded on the 
pre-existence of general principles in the legal system leading the Court of Justice to (lawfully) 
acknowledge their existence rather than (unlawfully) create a new legal source.5   
Over the years this unwritten source has been sided by several written sources. The EU 
provisions in the field of anti-discrimination law, however, have significant limitations which 
drastically reduce their capacity to provide an effective protection of equality.6  
Among the EU primary provisions in the field of equality law, neither art. 19 TFEU, nor art. 
21 of the EU Charter provide an effective protection of equality. On the one side, art. 19 TFEU 
foresees an exhaustive list of discriminatory grounds, it acts as a mere legal basis for the 
adoption of provisions combating discriminations and, as a result, it lacks direct effect.7 On the 
other side, even though the Charter could tackle further discriminatory grounds than those 
expressly mentioned in art. 21, its application is subject to the unclear wording of its horizontal 
clauses, and the direct effect of the EU Charter is still debated.8 Among the secondary 
provisions addressing equality – namely directive 2006/54,9 directive 2000/4310 and directive 
                                                          
3 Case C-29/69, Erich Stauder, cit.; Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, EU:C:1970:114; Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und 
Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities, EU:C:1974:51; Case 36/75, Roland Rutili v 
Ministre de l'intérieur, EU:C:1975:137; Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, EU:C:1979:290. 
4 AG Trstenjak in Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and 
Préfet de la région Centre, EU:C:2011:559 para. 94, who refers to the definition given by V.M. SCHWEITZER, W. 
HUMMER, W. OBWEXER, Europarecht. Das Recht Des Europäische Union,Vienna, 2007, at 65. 
5 K. LENAERTS, J. GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, The constitutional allocation of powers and general principles of EU law, 
in Common Market Law Review, 2010, 1629 ff., who at p. 1633 recall that such power of the Court of Justice is 
grounded on the following EU provisions: art. 19 TEU, art. 6(3) TEU and art. 340 TFEU. 
6 See E. SPAVENTA, Should we “harmonize” fundamental rights in the EU? Some reflections about minimum 
standards and fundamental rights protection in the EU composite constitutional system, in Common Market Law 
Review, 2018, 997 ff., at 1010. 
7 T. TRIDIMAS, The general principles of EU law, Oxford, 2006, at 64. 
8 On this topic, and specifically focusing on art. 21 EU Charter see A. WARD, The impact of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights on anti-discrimination law: more a whimper than a bang?, Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, 2018, 32 – 60, at. 36. 
9 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of 
the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation (recast) OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, 23 – 36. 
10 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal L 180, 19.07.2000, 22 – 26. 
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2000/7811 – only the latter directive tackles age and disability. Further to being only vertically 
and not horizontally enforceable, Directive 2000/78 merely applies in the field of employment 
and occupation, thus having only a limited impact in the establishment of equality.12  
The role of general principles can therefore be appreciated against the scenario just outlined: 
acknowledging that none of the EU sources is per se suitable to effectively tackle 
discrimination (and thus establish equality), general principles represent measures of last-resort 
in all those situations where the protection granted by the EU written provisions is inadequate. 
With a view of equipping the EU normative framework with a flexible and yet binding source 
of law, general principles have been recognised three main functions.13   
First, general principles have a gap-filling function. Thanks to their unwritten nature, general 
principles can easily fill the lacunae14 that emerge when applying EU law or implementing EU 
law at national level.15 Hence, general principles of EU law are judicially-driven norms,16 
spontaneously inferred by the Court from the array of primary and secondary provisions of EU 
law to complete the legal order established by the Treaties.17  
Second, general principles of EU law are essential tools for the interpretation of both EU law 
and national law anytime the latter is falling within the scope of EU law. To promote the 
protection of equality within the EU, the European Court of Justice has widely referred to 
general principles following the dual trend of engaging the concept of consistent interpretation, 
and broadening the interpretation of existing EU primary and secondary law.18  
Within a third function, general principles are instead contemplated as grounds for judicial 
review,19 in four different scenarios. In addition to the case of EU legislation and Treaties’ 
provisions, three other situations have been recognised as enabling the applicability of general 
principles of EU law: the ‘agency situation’, i.e. the situation where a member state is 
implementing an EU provision;20 the ‘derogation situation’, occurring when member states 
adopt a measure derogating from an EU provision;21 and the ‘substantive EU law situation’, 
covering those domestic measures which otherwise fall within the scope of application of EU 
law.22   
                                                          
11 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, 16 – 22. 
12 See L. WADDINGTON, M. BELL, More equal than others: distinguishing European Union equality directives, 
Common Market Law Review, 2001, 587 ff. See also S.M. CARBONE, Discriminazioni sulla base dell’età tra 
principi generali UE e criteri applicativi, Studi sull’integrazione europea, 2017, 23 ff.. 
13 See K. LENAERTS, J. GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, The constitutional allocation of powers, cit., at 1629. 
14 T. TRIDIMAS, Fundamental Rights, General Principles of EU Law, and the Charter, in Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, 2014, 361 ff., at 379. 
15 Joined Cases 201 and 202/85 Marthe Klensch and o. v Secrétaire d'État à l'Agriculture et à la Viticulture 
EU:C:1986:439. 
16 C. SEMMELMANN, General principles in EU law between a compensatory role and an intrinsic value, European 
Law Journal, 2013, 457 ff., at 461. 
17 K. LENAERTS, J. GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, The constitutional allocation of powers, cit., at 1632. 
18 Ibidem, at 1636. 
19 In both vertical and horizontal disputes. See T. TRIDIMAS, Horizontal Effects of General Principles: Bold 
Rulings and Fine Distinctions, in U. BERNITZ, X. GROUSSOT, F. SCHULYOK, General Principles of EU Law and 
European Private Law, Kluwer Law International, 2013, 213 ff., at 215.  
20 Case 5/88, Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft EU:C:1989:321. See also T. 
TRIDIMAS, The general principles of EU law, cit., at 36. 
21 Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v 
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others (ERT) EU:C:1991:254. An 
excellent investigation of the Court of Justice’s scrutiny in assessing both the ‘implementation’ and the 
‘derogation’ situations is provided by J. SNELL, Fundamental Rights Review of National Measures: Nothing New 
under the Charter?, in European Public Law, 2015, p. 285 ff., at 287.   
22 AG Sharpston in Case C-427/06 Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge GmbH 
EU:C:2008:297, para. 69. 
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Notwithstanding the function they serve, general principles embody common values already 
shared within the common constitutional traditions of the member states23 or implicitly 
accepted by member states when joining the EU.24 Therefore they belong to EU primary law 
and they enjoy a constitutional status.25  
There are two major implications connected to the status of general principles. First, any act 
adopted by the EU institutions, which is subject to judicial review, must comply with general 
principles,26 since it falls under the Court’s jurisdiction according to art. 19 TEU.27 Such an 
obligation is now formalised with regard to those general principles protecting fundamental 
rights – such as equality – that have been included in the Charter.28 Second, general principles 
of EU law bind all member states when they are acting within the scope of application of the 
Treaties.29  
The scenario presented so far was meant highlight the rationale behind the recognition of 
general principles as a EU primary source of law, i.e. to give the EU a degree of flexibility 
within the promotion of the ius commune europaeum. The following section will move from 
this remark in order to investigate whether – within a few recent rulings in the field of age and 
disability discrimination – the added value of using general principles as the key towards the 
achievement of equality is jeopardised by the persistent lack of methodology shown by the 
Court of Justice when addressing them.30 
 
 
3. The convoluted approach of the Court of Justice towards the concept of 
‘interpretation’: Kaltoft  
The current CJEU approach towards the use of general principles raises a few concerns 
regarding the distinction between ‘interpretation’ and ‘law-making’. According to the Court of 
Justice itself, the second function carried out by general principles is that of guiding the 
interpretation of EU written provisions. In other words, every EU provision shall be interpreted 
in compliance with EU general principles, i.e. in the way which best accommodates the value(s) 
protected by the general principle.  
As a consequence, the Court of Justice discretion when interpreting EU law might vary 
depending on the room for interpretation that the written provision itself allows. This, however, 
should never result into a normative activity exercised by the Court of Justice, given that the 
Court of Justice, as the EU jurisdictional body, is prevented from creating new legal provisions.  
Notwithstanding the alleged clarity of the divide between interpretation and law-making, the 
recent Kaltoft ruling shows how such distinction can in fact be blurring. The dispute that 
triggered the preliminary reference procedure involved Mr Kaltoft, a Danish child-minder, and 
the Municipality of Billund, a Danish public administrative authority. Mr Kaltoft was hired by 
the Municipality of Billund to work as child-minder by taking care of children at his home. At 
                                                          
23 S. ROBIN-OLIVIER, Le principe d’égalité en droit communautaire. Etude à partir des libertés économiques, 
P.U.A.M., 1999, at 329 ; C. SEMMELMANN, General principles in EU law between a compensatory role and an 
intrinsic value, cit., at 462. 
24 Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration EU:C:1963:1. 
25 K. LENAERTS, J. GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, The constitutional allocation of powers and general principles of EU law, 
cit., at 1647. T. TRIDIMAS, The general principles of EU law, cit., at 51. 
26 T. TRIDIMAS, The general principles of EU law, cit., at 50. 
27 Cases 46/93 and 48/93, 5 March 1996, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen 
v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others., ECLI:EU:C:1996:79, para. 27. 
28 T. TRIDIMAS, The general principles of EU law, cit., at 11 – 12. 
29 Editorial Comments, The scope of application of the general principles of Union Law: An ever expanding 
Union?, in Common Market Law Review, 2010, at 1589. 
30 See M. ROSS, Effectiveness in the European Legal order(s): Beyond supremacy to constitutional 
proportionality?, in European Law Review, 2006, 476 ff. 
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the time when Mr Kaltoft was employed, he suffered from severe obesity and was subsequently 
provided by the employer with financial assistance with the aim of letting him attend physical 
and fitness sessions in order to lose weight. Despite Mr Kaltoft’s attempts, his loss of weight 
was systematically regained. Hence, when in late 2010 the decline in child numbers forced the 
Municipality of Billund to nominate a child-minder for dismissal, it was decided that Mr 
Kaltoft would be the addressee of such action.  
Given the vagueness of the reasons for his dismissal, and acknowledging that he was the only 
child-minder to have been dismissed, Mr Kaltoft expressed the view that such decision had 
been taken because of his obesity. He therefore referred to the Fag og Arbejde (FOA), the 
Danish union of public employees, in order to bring a claim alleging that he was a victim of 
discrimination on grounds of obesity and sought compensation.  
In the main proceedings, the Danish court found that a clarification regarding EU law was 
essential in order to solve the dispute. In particular, the Danish court referred to the Court of 
Justice to ascertain whether EU equality law prohibits discrimination on grounds of obesity 
and, if this was not the case, whether obesity could be considered a form of disability and 
therefore fall under the EU rules covering non-discrimination on grounds of disability. 
After highlighting that non-discrimination is a general principle of EU law which is ‘binding 
on Member States where the national situation at issue in the main proceedings falls within the 
scope of EU law’,31 the Court of Justice recalled that neither EU primary legislation, nor the 
EU secondary provisions mention obesity as a discriminatory ground. Stating the impossibility 
of expanding the scope of application of the existing legal provisions, the Court thus answered 
the first question declaring that non-discrimination on grounds of obesity cannot be considered 
a general principle of EU law.   
The solution offered by the Court of Justice seemed to be the only possible under EU law: 
considering the principle of conferred competence, and stressing that general principles of law 
shall apply within the field of application of EU law, there seems to be no room for a general 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of obesity. 
However, such reasonable ‘self-restraint’ of the Court has been immediately overridden as soon 
as the second preliminary ruling has been examined: the Court in fact clarified that, although 
being subject to specific conditions, obesity can amount to a disability within the meaning of 
Directive 2000/7832 and therefore benefit from the protection foreseen by the directive itself.  
After recalling that the EU has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities,33 the Court stressed how the notion of disability must be intended as either 
impossibility or hindrance upon the ability to exercise a professional activity. Although obesity 
itself cannot be considered a disability, under some circumstances obesity can indeed represent 
a long-term limitation that ‘may hinder the full and effective participation of that person in 
professional life on an equal basis with other workers’.34 This being the case, obesity would 
then fall under the concept of disability foreseen by Directive 2000/78, so that any disparate 
treatment grounded on such a factor – unless justified under the directive itself – would amount 
to discrimination on grounds of disability.  
                                                          
31 Case C-354/13 Fag og Arbejde (FOA) acting on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft, cit., para. 32. 
32 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, O.J. L 303, 02 December 2000, 16. 
33 The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, A/RES/61/106, was 
adopted on 13 December 2006 and was opened for signature on 30 March 2007. It entered into force on 3 May 
2008. 
34 Case C-354/13 Fag og Arbejde (FOA) acting on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft, cit., para. 59. 
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As a result of this recent decision, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of disability 
– which also applies to individuals primarily responsible for the care of disabled people35 – has 
been de facto entitled to cover obesity.  
Although, on the bright side, the Court was aiming to provide an enhanced interpretation of the 
notion of disability in order to protect Mr. Kaltoft’s rights, the judgment triggers a few 
criticisms from the perspective of EU anti-discrimination law.  
First and foremost, Kaltoft seems to be an example of the enlargement of the EU field of 
application through general principles. Directive 2000/78 now has the potential to cover obesity 
discrimination too, although the enlargement of the field of application of such a directive does 
not seem to fall under the concept of interpretation but rather under the concept of law-making. 
If this is the case, the criticisms that were raised in the aftermath of Mangold36 have been 
proven to be valid: notwithstanding the Court’s statements, unwritten general principles have 
indeed the power to alter the conditions for the application of the EU written provisions.37  
This concern is worsen by the observation that the same substantive result, i.e. protecting 
individuals against obesity discrimination, could have been achieved without bending 
Directive 2000/78 to an unnatural function. This conundrum could have been solved by looking 
at the non-exhaustive list of discriminatory grounds foreseen in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and by following the ratio decidendi of the Åkerberg Fransson case as a guideline.38 
On the one side, the Charter does allow the enlargement of the discriminatory grounds 
expressly foreseen in its art. 21. On the other side, the relevant national provisions affecting 
Mr Kaltoft’s situation did amount to national provisions falling under the scope of application 
of EU law. Therefore, instead of relying tout court on directive 2000/78, the Court could have 
once and for all accommodated the legal value of the Charter by acknowledging its 
enforceability within the situation at stake.  
Under a different, and yet similar point of view, Kaltoft decision also exacerbates the scenario 
belonging to EU anti-discrimination law. Disregarding the need for clarification that has been 
stressed by several fronts, the Court of Justice’s current approach makes it almost impossible 
to predict whether a given situation will fall under the field of EU discrimination law.39  
 
4. The neurotic approach towards direct effect: Dansk Industri and Parris  
The analysis of two recent decisions on the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age 
entangles further observations concerning the lack of methodology governing the use of EU 
general principles as grounds for judicial review. 
                                                          
35 Case C-303/06, S. Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law, EU:C:2008:415. 
36 Judgment of the Court of 22 November 2005, case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:709. See M. ROSS, Effectiveness in the European Legal order(s): Beyond supremacy to 
constitutional proportionality?, cit., at 494. 
37 The core of the debate being whether EU directives were had been given horizontal direct effect. In the sense 
of recognising such an effect, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his Opinion of 27 April 2004, Bernhard Pfeiffer (C-
397/01), Wilhelm Roith (C-398/01), Albert Süß (C-399/01), Michael Winter (C-400/01), Klaus Nestvogel (C-
401/01), Roswitha Zeller (C-402/01) and Matthias Döbele (C-403/01) v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband 
Waldshut and V, Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, in Reports, 2004, I-8835; and, again, of 24 April 2008, 
Othmar Michaeler (C-55/07 and C-56/07), Subito GmbH (C-55/07 and C-56/07) and Ruth Volgger (C-56/07) v 
Amt für sozialen Arbeitsschutz and Autonome Provinz Bozen, Joined cases C-55/07 and C-56/07, in Reports, 2008, 
I-3135. On the contrary, in the sense of excluding any direct effect of directives and, moreover, of relaying the 
applicability of general principles to the limits and conditions of the directives, see the Opinion of AG Mazak of 
16 October 2007, Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA, Case C-411/05, in Reports, 2007, I-8531. 
For a comment on this subject, see K. LENAERTS, The Principle of Equal Treatment and the European Court of 
Justice, in Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2013, 461 ff. 
38 Judgment of the Court 26 February 2013, case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:105. 
39 See para 164 in A.G. Trstenjak’s Opinion in Case C-282/10, Dominguez, cit. 
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After the controversial judgments in Mangold and Kücükdeveci,40 the Court of Justice has 
recently dealt with the direct effect of the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of age in two further decisions: Dansk Industri41 and Parris.42 Both judgments raise a few 
criticisms related to the consistency (and the fairness) of EU equality law: they in fact sharpen 
the complexity of understanding whether a given situation will receive an actual protection by 
EU law or if it will simply be dismissed by referring to either States’ sovereignty and discretion 
or to the justification test under the EU equality directive.  
The Dansk Industri case originated from Mr Rasmussen’s attempt to get a severance allowance 
in addition to his pension, once he had been dismissed from the Danish company, Ajos A/S, 
where he had been working for more than twenty years. Disregarding his potential entitlement 
to receive such allowance, its effective enjoyment was precluded under a provision of Danish 
law that excluded the payment of the severance allowance for those dismissed employees that 
were at the time entitled to an old-age pension and that joined the pension scheme before 
turning 50 years old. Against this backdrop, Mr Rasmussen felt he had been discriminated 
against on grounds of age also because the same provision of the law on salaried employees 
had already been found to be inconsistent with EU law within a previous judgment of the 
European Court of Justice.43 
Within the abovementioned scenario, and after acknowledging the horizontality of the dispute, 
the Danish Supreme Court raised two different questions: first, whether the concerned national 
provision should be considered to be in violation of the EU general principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age; and second, whether the potential contrariety to the EU 
general principle should be somehow weighted against two other general principles of EU law, 
particularly the principle of legitimate expectation and the principle of legal certainty. 
The Court’s approach to both preliminary questions looks bold: as a first point of clarification, 
the Court recalled Mangold and Kücükdeveci judgments to highlight that the combination of 
the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age with Directive 2000/78 would 
require the non-application of a conflicting national provision. Given that any consistent 
interpretation had already been excluded in the Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark case, only the 
disapplication of such a provision could successfully ensure the genuine enjoyment of equality 
on grounds of age. When turning to the second preliminary question, however, the reasoning 
of the Court does not seem to have a clear focus about the consequences that the ruling would 
have triggered. When asked about the possibility of balancing general principles to prevent a 
general principle, such as non-discrimination on grounds of age, from jeopardising the respect 
and the enjoyment of other general principles, the Court quite abruptly clarified that no such 
issue would happen and that, in any case, the direct effect of the general principle of non-
discrimination on grounds age should not be limited on that basis.44  
The reasoning above has the merit of proving the importance of age equality. Yet, it seems that, 
once again, the Court of Justice has failed to anticipate the ultimate outcome of its strong stance. 
The side effects of the Dansk Industry decision have in fact emerged as soon as the Danish 
Supreme Court acknowledged the outcome of the preliminary ruling and accommodated it into 
the dispute at the main proceeding.45 Instead of recognising Mr. Rasmussen’s entitlement not 
                                                          
40 Judgment of the Court of 19 January 2010, case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:21. 
41 Case C-441/14 Dansk Industri (DI), cit. 
42 Case C-443/15 David L. Parris v Trinity College Dublin and Others EU:C:2016:897. 
43 Case C-499/08 Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark v Region Syddanmark EU:C:2010:600. 
44 S.M. CARBONE, Discriminazioni sulla base dell’età tra principi generali UE e criteri applicativi, cit., at 26. 
45 See R. HOLDGAARD, D. ELKAN, G. K. SCHALDEMOSE, From cooperation to collision: The ECJ’s Ajos ruling 
and the Danish Supreme Court’s refusal to comply, 2018, in Common Market Law Review, 17 ff.; E. SPAVENTA, 
Should we “harmonize” fundamental rights in the EU?, cit., at 1002; E. GUALCO, La Cour de justice retourne sur 
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to be discriminated against because of his age, the Danish Supreme Court rather preferred to 
state that general principles of EU law are not covered by the Danish law of accession to the 
EU and therefore are not binding within the Danish legal system unless a specific amendment 
to such law is made.  
Although such a reaction cannot be justified, it can be quite easily explained: under the member 
states’ point of view, the outcome of the preliminary ruling in Dansk Industri could be and was 
perceived as a threat to states’ sovereignty powers and prerogatives.46 The unwritten form of 
general principles and the fact that they are quite arbitrarily ‘discovered’ by the European Court 
of Justice prevents member states from exercising any ex ante check on this source of law. If 
general principles were written legislation, member states would have an indirect control over 
them via the EU institutions, but because no legislative process is involved when general 
principles are at stake, the only kind of supervision left to member states is an ex post check to 
assess the compliance of general principles with the national constitutional foundations. The 
Danish Supreme Court has clearly implemented this latter form of control by indirectly 
assessing that the effects of general principles into the national legal system have gone too 
far.47  
In the aftermath of the Danish Court’s decision several questions have arisen. A first – and 
theoretical – issue focuses on the need to clarify whether a better investigation by the Court of 
Justice could have potentially prevented such a strong reaction of the Danish Court. A second, 
and much more important question, deals with the resulting uncertainty regarding the status of 
general principles in the national legal systems and the impact of this ruling on the relationship 
between Denmark and the European Union. 
In this regard, one may easily argue that the Danish Supreme Court’s reasoning can be 
dismissed as inconsistent under EU law by simply recalling the nature and the functioning of 
EU general principles: as unwritten provisions which are not created, but purely discovered by 
the Court of Justice, these principles permeate the EU legal system as a whole, therefore being 
implicitly acknowledged as soon as a State joins the EU. In other words, Member States’ 
commitment to be bound by general principles seems to be embedded in their national legal 
provisions allowing the accession to the EU.  
The abovementioned observation, however, does not change the fact that the Danish Supreme 
Court ruling openly challenges the EU general principles and their suitability as a source for 
protecting equality. Given the need to ensure that EU law is uniformly and consistently 
observed across the member states, the importance of that reasoning should not be disregarded 
but it should lead the Court of Justice to question (if not rethink) its overreliance on general 
principles. As stressed throughout this paper, although being a valuable source of protection of 
equality, the unwritten form of general principles on the one side, and the huge discretion that 
the Court of Justice exercises when applying general principles, on the other side, has the 
potential to undermine the effective and fair enjoyment of equality. 
This last observation has been recently confirmed in Parris. The decision in this case originated 
from a dispute between Dr Parris, a former lecturer having both Irish and British nationality, 
and his employer, Trinity College Dublin. Within the pension scheme provided by this 
institution, a survivor’s pension would have been payable to the spouse or, since 1 January 
                                                          
l’effet direct du principe de non-discrimination en raison de l’âge: (encore) beaucoup de bruit pour rien?, in 
federalismi.it, 2017, 1 ff., at 13. 
46 See K. LENAERTS, J. GUTIERREZ-FONS, The Role of general principles of EU law, in A. ARNULL, C. BARNARD, 
M. DOUGAN, E. SPAVENTA, A constitutional order of States? Essays in EU law in honour of Alan Dashwood, 
Oxford, 2011, at 181, who already pointed out that national courts ‘may perceive general principles as illegitimate 
judicial law making and deciding to stop engaging with the ECJ’. 
47 G. ZACCARONI, Is the horizontal application of general principles ultra vires? Dialogue and conflict between 
supreme European courts in Dansk Industri, in federalismi.it, 2018, at 1. 
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2011, to the civil partner of the University’s employees. This rule applied only to members 
who were married or entered into civil partnerships before turning 60 years old. Following his 
appointment in 1972, Dr Parris joined the university pension scheme. Nevertheless, as Dr Parris 
was homosexual, he could neither get married nor enter into a civil partnership until 2005, 
when same-sex partnerships became legal in the UK according to the Civil Partnership Act. 
On that basis, Dr Parris registered a civil partnership with his partner on 21 April 2009: at that 
time he was aged 63. 
Furthermore, as soon as the Civil Partnership Act was enacted in Ireland, Dr Parris approached 
Trinity College Dublin and requested to join the survivor’s pension scheme offered by the 
University. The above-mentioned Act entered into force on 1 January 2011 and shortly after, 
Dr Parris – who retired at the end of 2010 – received notification that his civil partnership had 
been recognised in the UK. 
Despite this formal recognition, the Irish Higher Education Academy rejected Dr Parris’ 
request to access the survivor’s pension scheme on the grounds, first, that the recognition of 
the partnership was granted after his retirement; and second, that – since Dr Parris entered into 
a civil partnership after reaching the age of 60 years old – the age requirement foreseen by the 
University policy was not met. 
Faced with obvious disappointment, Dr Parris brought a claim before the Irish Labour Court 
arguing that he was a victim of discrimination by reason of his age and sexual orientation.  
Against this backdrop, the Irish Court sought clarification from the European Court of Justice 
in order to assess whether the domestic provision at stake led to discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation; discrimination on grounds of age; discrimination on those grounds 
combined. 
Following a relatively simplistic reasoning, the Court of Justice denied that any of the above 
discrimination would trigger a violation of equality. As regard to the first preliminary question, 
after excluding any form of direct discrimination, the Court of Justice denied the existence of 
indirect discrimination as well. Despite the possibility of affecting homosexual employees 
more severely than heterosexual employees, the 60-year age limit was found to be legitimate 
not because of the justification test provided within Directive 2000/78,48 but because the 
directive shall apply ‘without prejudice to national laws on marital status and the benefits 
depended thereon’.49 Hence, because Dr Parris turned 60 before homosexual partnerships were 
even introduced in Ireland, the preliminary requirement for indirect discrimination to operate 
was missing. 
Shifting to the second preliminary question, the Court clarified that the rule at stake could not 
constitute discrimination on grounds of age given that it merely laid down an age limit for the 
entitlement to receive a survivor’s benefit, which therefore fell under the exception of art. 6(2) 
directive 2000/78. As a logical conclusion to the observations made above, the Court then 
stated that – given the absence of both discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and 
discrimination on grounds of age – no multiple or intersectional discrimination could arise.  
As this short overview indirectly highlights, the role and function of general principles is not 
even mentioned in the decision above. Such self-restraint appears to be surprising and 
disappointing at time: surprising because Parris has been delivered after quite a (if not too) 
bold ruling, i.e. Dansk Industri; and disappointing for several reasons that will now be 
presented. 
                                                          
48 Under art. 6 Directive 2000/78, supra n. 66, a national measure has to pursue a legitimate aim and be 
proportionate towards that goal in order to be legitimate according to EU anti-discrimination law. In this regard, 
the Irish provision clearly intended to discourage marriages of convenience, whereas the rule was aimed at 
excluding the potential abuse of the pension benefits. 
49 Case C-443/15 David L. Parris, supra n. 75, para. 57; Recital 22, Directive 2000/78, supra n. 66. 
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First, the Parris case represented an excellent opportunity for the Court to clarify the effect of 
general principles according to EU law, particularly explaining if and to what extent a hierarchy 
among general principles exists. 
Secondly, Parris raises a concern related to another kind of hierarchy: the one among 
discriminatory grounds. As known, when the Mangold judgment was delivered only a few 
member states already foresaw age as a ground of discrimination, whereas the majority of the 
member states still lacked any provision covering age equality. Yet, this issue has not prevented 
the Court of Justice from acknowledging that age equality still represented a value commonly 
shared by all member states, which therefore deserved to be qualified as a general principle of 
EU law. On a different note, the Charter has made fundamental rights more understandable by 
listing, among other, the grounds that member states and by consequence the European Union 
qualify as discriminatory. This means that, since the creation of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in 2000, non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation has certainly been 
recognised as a common value across the member states.50 Consequently, despite member 
states’ autonomy to regulate marital status, as soon as same-sex partnerships (and then 
marriages) were introduced in Ireland, Dr Parris had indeed become entitled not to be 
discriminated against because of his sexual orientation.51 As also stressed by the Advocate 
General,52 the fact that Dr Parris joined a pension scheme before having the legal opportunity 
to register his civil partnership does not alter such a conclusion. In the light of these 
observations, why is non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation still prevented from 
being a EU general principle?53 
Further to the remark above, the Court’s decision has omitted an accurate analysis of the 
existence of discrimination on grounds of age. As a matter of fact, Ireland’s alleged goal to 
prevent marriages of convenience occurring merely for pension and other benefits does not 
seem to justify the unfair treatment demonstrated within the dispute at the main proceeding. If 
under the perspective of age equality, the 60 years old limit could potentially avoid 
heterosexual marriages of convenience, when homosexual couples are at stake, such a limit 
leads to obvious discrimination. Given that homosexual partners were prevented from entering 
into any legal partnership until 2010, the survivor’s pension scheme would automatically be 
precluded for all employees that were already 60 years old at that time. Hence, this category of 
individuals – like Dr Parris – would clearly be victims of an intersectional discrimination 
grounded on both sexual orientation and age. 
Against this backdrop, one further criticism of the Parris decision rests on the last of a series 
of missed occasions for the Court to finally accommodate the existence of intersectional 
discrimination.54 Despite the lack of an express provision on this, the acknowledgment of 
intersectional discrimination seems perfectly compatible with the idea that all discriminatory 
grounds belong to a common general principle of equality. In addition to that, and under a more 
operational point of view, it should be pointed out that if discrimination based on one ground 
                                                          
50 Despite the accomplishment achieved when art 13 EC was created, the insertion of a right to non-discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation within the Charter was still needed in order to finally trigger the doctrine of direct 
effect, feature that has been so far excluded with regard to art. 13 EC (now art 19 TFEU).  
51 M. MÖSCHEL, If and when age and sexual orientation discrimination intersect: Parris, Common Market Law 
Review, 2017, 1835 ff., at 1842. 
52 AG Kokott in Case C-443/15 David L. Parris, cit., paras. 100 – 110. 
53 Furthermore, it is worth to point out that sexual orientation tends to be unreasonably disregarded also when the 
application of art. 21 EU Charter is at stake. At this regard, see A. WARD, The impact of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights on anti-discrimination law: more a whimper than a bang?, cit., at 42. 
54 M. MÖSCHEL, If and when age and sexual orientation discrimination intersect: Parris, cit., at 1845. See also R. 
NIELSEN, Is European Union equality law capable of addressing multiple and intersectional discrimination yet? 
Precautions against neglecting intersectional cases, in D. SCHIEK, V. CHEGE, European Union Non-
Discrimination Law. Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law, Routledge, 2009, at 31. 
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jeopardises equality, then a disparate treatment focusing on multiple or on a combination of 
grounds55 even more so breaches equality.56 As an ultimate observation, it could be stressed 
that for once the reliance on an unwritten provision such as the general principle of equality 
would be not only suitable but highly desirable. Insofar as EU written norms prohibit 
discrimination on several grounds, it is only logical to affirm that whenever a single provision 
can infringe two or more manifestations of equality at a time, such a provision should be 
labelled as discriminatory. In the absence of any express statement on that issue, the gap-filling 
function of general principles could easily and smoothly fill this blank.  
A last issue stemming from Dansk Industri and Parris judgments is connected to the principle 
of equality as a whole: the lack of any methodology in the Court’s case law and the huge 
discretion that the Court deploys in the field of equality ultimately undermines the respect and 
enjoyment of equality within the European Union. On the one hand, individuals are given the 
opportunity to receive actual protection under EU equality law thanks to the direct effect of 
general principles; on the other hand, however, they cannot rely on clear guidance to 
understand when they can successfully trigger direct effect and when, on the contrary, the 
benefits of such a doctrine are precluded.  
  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has acknowledged that general principles of EU law are not only a valuable source 
of protection of equality on grounds of age and disability, but also a passe-partout key enabling 
the EU legal order the degree of flexibility to cope with the challenges an increasingly 
integrated Union entails. General principles of EU law are in fact an almost unlimited source 
of protection of equality as far as – thanks to their inner flexibility – their content and their 
effects can be easily adapted to any situation where the respect of equality is questioned.  
Against the backdrop above, the paper has however stressed the possible risks that the other 
inner aspect of general principles,57 i.e. their vagueness, involves in terms of uniformity and 
legal certainty within the protection of such equality. The paper has highlighted that three main 
shortcomings are still seeking an accommodation by the European Court of Justice. 
A first criticism focuses on the necessity of balancing the enhancement of general principles as 
a tool for protecting equality with the respect of other fundamental principles of EU law, such 
as the fundamental rights of the counterparty within a horizontal dispute. In this regard, the 
Court of Justice in the Dansk Industri case58 demonstrated that the main effect of the so-called 
Mangold approach is to impose on private parties the obligation to respect fundamental rights 
that the State was in the first place unable to ensure, and, as a consequence, to transfer the 
related liability from States onto individuals.59 Despites the Court’s insistence that the 
horizontal direct effect of a general principle of EU law – like that of non-discrimination on 
grounds of age – shall prevail over the principles of legal certainty and the protection of 
legitimate expectations,60 this approach does not seem to maximise the protection of a 
fundamental right, but rather to jeopardise it. 
                                                          
55 With regard to Dr Parris also defined as a ‘compounded type of discrimination [...] situated at the crossroads of 
age and sexual orientation discrimination’ (M. MÖSCHEL, If and when age and sexual orientation discrimination 
intersect: Parris, cit., at 1848). 
56 AG Kokott in Case C-443/15 David L. Parris, supra n. 52, paras. 147 – 159. 
57 See L.S. ROSSI, How fundamental are fundamental principles? Primacy and fundamental rights after Lisbon, 
in Yearbook of European Law, 2008, p. 65 ff., at 87, who argues that ‘fundamental principles remain a sort of 
grey area, where vagueness and flexibility are two sides of the same coin’. 
58 Case C-441/14 Dansk Industri (DI), supra n. 26, para. 28. 
59 E. SPAVENTA, The horizontal application of fundamental rights as general principles of Union law, in A. 
ARNULL, C. BARNARD, M. DOUGAN, E. SPAVENTA, A constitutional order of States? Essays in EU law in honour 
of Alan Dashwood, cit., at 217. 
60 Case C-441-14 Dansk Industri (DI), supra n. 26, paras. 38 – 43. 
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Considering that the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations 
have been recognised as general principles of the EU in themselves,61 the Court should, at least, 
elaborate a methodology for the horizontal application of general principles of EU law.62 
Otherwise, notwithstanding the efforts to increase the protection of fundamental rights, such as 
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age – by foreseeing different but connected 
paths, the risk is to see the constitutional edifice of the European Union imploding.63 
A second concern deals with the possibility of extending the recognition of horizontal direct 
effect to further general principles64 than the one (non-discrimination on grounds of age) that 
has already received such assessment by the Court of Justice. In this regard, if the idea of 
extending this characteristic to all fundamental rights protected by the European Union would 
be tempting, its concrete application would probably bring both the EU and the national 
jurisdictional systems to collapse.65 When it comes to equality, however, it seems that 
extending the horizontal effect of equality to further grounds than those already covered66 
should be not only logical, but also fair. Moving from the remark that all grounds of 
discrimination represent an expression of the broader and supreme principle of equality, no 
distinction should be made in regard to their enforcement and effect. If the Court has recently 
followed this latter approach with regard to the interpretation of discrimination on grounds of 
religion,67 the above-mentioned risk has instead materialised in the Parris decision, when the 
Court of justice deliberately neglected to recognise the equal value of all discriminatory 
grounds protected at EU level, by not accommodating the direct effect of non-discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation. Such a neurotic case-law – that tends to create a hierarchy 
among discriminatory grounds – is much likely to ultimately frustrate the effective protection 
of equality in the EU.68 
Lastly, the commitment towards mainstream equality has to be recalled: art. 10 TFEU implies 
that the European Union has embedded the respect of equal treatment in each and every activity 
carried out at supranational level. This translates into an obligation to ensure the effective 
enjoyment of equality, which goes beyond the mere enunciation of the right to equal treatment 
and actually entails the institutions’ duty to accommodate equality in all situations, i.e. to read 
the EU policies and actions through the lens of equality. Being one of the EU institutions, the 
European Court of Justice has to comply with the obligation above. The criticisms outlined in 
the present paper, however, describe quite a different scenario: given the tailored approach 
towards general principles currently followed by the Court of Justice, the Court seems more 
oriented towards ensuring individual justice rather than implementing an equal and coherent 
enjoyment of equality.  
The resulting paradox of such an approach, however, is that the inner significance of equality 
itself risks being ultimately frustrated. As the paper has pointed out, the lack of methodology 
                                                          
61 F. FONTANELLI, General Principles of EU Law and a Glimpse of Solidarity in the Aftermath of Mangold and 
Kücükdeveci, in European Public Law, 2011, 225, at 234. 
62 K. LENAERTS, J. GUTIERREZ-FONS, The Role of general principles of EU law, cit., at 181. 
63 E. SPAVENTA, The horizontal application of fundamental rights as general principles of Union law, cit., at 218, 
expresses her concern by affirming that ‘the Court risks transforming the constitutional ‘order’ of states in a 
constitutional chaos’.  
64 T. TRIDIMAS, Horizontal Effects of General Principles: Bold Rulings and Fine Distinctions, cit., at 213. 
65 This scenario seems to be portrayed also by E. SPAVENTA, Should we “harmonize” fundamental rights in the 
EU?, cit. at 1022. 
66 Namely sex, nationality and age. 
67 Judgment of the Court of 17 April 2018, case C-414/16, Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie 
und Entwicklung e.V., ECLI:EU:C:2018:257. See L. LOURENÇO, Religion, discrimination and the EU general 
principles’ gospel: Egenberger, in Common Market Law Review, 2019, 193 ff.; R. MCCREA, Salvation outside 
the church? The ECJ rules on religious discrimination in employment, 2018, in EU Law Analysis, available at 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/04/salvation-outside-church-ecj-rules-on.html. 
68 See E. SPAVENTA, Should we “harmonize” fundamental rights in the EU?, cit., at 1022. 
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together with the clear fragmentation and unpredictability of the Court’s decisions triggers the 
idea that instead of being a universal and constitutional value, equality – as a general principle 
of EU law – has sadly become a passe-partout key capable of opening the Pandora’s box of 
the Court’s discretion. 
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